For the past two and a half months, a blockade on the “strategic” roads linking Mali to Senegal and Mauritania—imposed by al-Qaeda–affiliated jihadists (Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa’l Muslimin, JNIM)—has been paralysing Bamako, the Malian capital and a city of over three million inhabitants.

The blockade affects key routes: RN1 (running through Kayes and connecting Mali to Senegal), and RN3 and RN25 (crossing Nioro du Sahel, just 20 km from the Mauritanian border), in the Kayes region in western Mali. It followed a government measure enacted during the summer making fuel procurement through “informal” channels illegal, restricting supply exclusively to official fuel stations—which, however, exist only in cities. The move was intended to hinder jihadist groups that, among other revenue streams, rely heavily on fuel smuggling. Attacks on convoys bound for the capital have triggered fuel shortages, school and university closures, blackouts, and an economic slowdown, placing unprecedented pressure on the military junta that has ruled the country since 2021, following the August 2020 coup.

Much has been said about the group’s alleged ambition to overthrow the regime and seize control of the capital. Yet it remains unclear whether JNIM truly possesses the military capability—or the intent—to do so. At present, the organisation appears instead to be employing economic siege as leverage to force the junta into negotiations. The group has demonstrated a remarkable ability to intercept fuel shipments in western and southwestern Mali, operating in small mobile units and penetrating areas that were, until recently, considered government strongholds. Throughout the month, numerous ambushes, improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, and fuel-truck burnings have been recorded, underscoring the intensification of JNIM operations and their increasing control over logistical routes.

Fuel shortages are now acutely felt in Bamako, where the government has been forced to escort tanker convoys with units from the FAMA (Malian Armed Forces) and the Africa Corps—the private military company that replaced Wagner after the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, now essentially under the authority of the Russian Ministry of Defence and officially contracted by Mali since 2021. This redirection of assets has strained the allocation of strategic resources across the country. The FAMA have attempted to respond with airstrikes—likely conducted with Turkish-made BAYRAKTAR drones—supported by Africa Corps helicopters, along with targeted operations to protect the main fuel supply routes. However, the situation remains extremely fragile. Several FAMA officers have been held responsible for failures in crisis management and subsequently removed or sanctioned, highlighting mounting tension within Mali’s military establishment in response to JNIM’s new strangulation strategy.

The crisis has been further exacerbated by the substantial ransom paid on 30 October by the United Arab Emirates for the release of two Emirati nationals kidnapped by JNIM—an estimated USD 50 million. The deal reportedly included the release of several JNIM militants imprisoned in Mali.

Meanwhile, numerous other foreign hostages—including Chinese, Indian, and Iranian nationals—remain in JNIM custody. This situation, combined with general instability, has led many foreign governments to advise against or outright prohibit travel to Mali and to urge their citizens to leave the country. Among these are France, the United States, Italy, Germany, and Canada.

In southern and western Mali—where the recent blockades have been concentrated—JNIM spokesperson Abou Houzeifa al-Bambari declared in an Al-Zallaqa video published on the social platform Chirpwire that all fuel imports from Senegal, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, and Mauritania are banned. JNIM’s strategy of striking Mali’s economic infrastructure—including attacks on foreign-owned factories and gold mines since May 2025—likely seeks to undermine the legitimacy of the Malian military government and further destabilise strategic regions such as Kayes, which hosts the country’s main trade corridor with Senegal (RN1). Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire are Mali’s primary fuel suppliers, and the region also contains most of Mali’s gold, lithium, bauxite, iron, and other mineral deposits.

Understanding the dynamics of this crisis—the latest phase of a conflict that began in 2008, when the first jihadist attacks occurred in Mali—requires a closer look at the origins and logic of the main actors on the ground.

JNIM is a coalition originally formed by four al-Qaeda-linked militant Islamist groups active in the Sahel, particularly in the zone stretching from northern Mali to southeastern Burkina Faso. The four groups that merged in 2017 were Ansar Dine, the Macina Liberation Front (FLM), al-Mourabitoun, and AQIM’s Sahara Emirate. Today, JNIM’s leadership effectively rests with representatives of only two founding groups: Iyad Ag Ghali of Ansar Dine—considered the overall emir of JNIM—and Amadou Koufa of the FLM. The latter has led by far the most active faction within JNIM, operating from its stronghold in central Mali (Mopti and Ségou regions) and expanding westwards and southwards into Burkina Faso. The coalition’s composition is significant, as its leaders represent Tuareg, Fulani, and Arab jihadists from both the Sahel and the Maghreb, giving the impression of a unified and expanding organisation. In reality, each faction maintains distinctive objectives, organisational structures, recruitment patterns, and operational tactics.

Militant Islamist groups first appeared in the Sahel, in northern Mali, roughly 20 years ago with the arrival of fighters from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), already battle-hardened from Algeria’s civil war. Building on this growing influence, Tuareg leader Iyad ag Ghali from Kidal founded Ansar Dine in 2011, which became one of the founding pillars of JNIM, with ag Ghali recognised as its official emir. For much of 2012, Islamist groups occupied northern Mali, taking advantage of the return of Tuareg rebels who had fought for Muammar Gaddafi in Libya during the 2011 uprising before pushing south into the more populous, resource-rich central regions. In January 2013, at the request of the Malian government, France launched Operation SERVAL, which succeeded in pushing back the rebels and forcing them into the vast, rugged northern territories. Later that year, the UN Security Council established MINUSMA—formally replacing AFISMA, the African Union-led mission authorised by the UN—whose mandate continued until 31 December 2023. In 2014, Operation BARKHANE superseded SERVAL as France’s regional counterterrorism mission, with participation from several European states, including Italy through Task Force TAKUBA, also active in Niger and Burkina Faso (Liptako-Gourma tri-border area). BARKHANE officially ended in 2022, and the last French troops withdrew from Mali in 2024.

Following their retreat to the north in 2013, ag Ghali used Ansar Dine fighters to carve out an enclave of political influence among the various armed groups operating in northern Mali.

Further south, in central Mali, FLM leader Amadou Koufa has directed the bloodiest insurgency among JNIM’s factions, attempting to dismantle traditional authorities and impose a strict interpretation of Sharia in the territories under his control. FLM’s activities and influence have also extended into northern Burkina Faso, supported by ties with a Burkinabè militant group founded by a protégé of Koufa.

Today, the JNIM coalition wields more territorial influence and control in Mali than at any other point in the 13-year insurgency. Over the past year, the FLM has progressively expanded from central Mali down toward the country’s south.

Against this backdrop, the Tuareg of the Sahel—often referred to as the “Blue People” for their indigo turban and garments—maintain a significant presence. In Mali, the Azawad Army—comprising Tuareg groups seeking autonomy for the territory of Azawad—operates mainly in the rural and desert areas around Kidal, while the cities remain under state and Africa Corps control. As a historically nomadic population, the Tuareg do not recognise rigid political borders, and their presence extends into Niger, where the MPLJ (Patriotic Movement for Freedom and Justice) is active; into Chad, with FACT (Front for Change and Concord in Chad); and into Libya, where militias are more fragmented and clan-based.

Although relations between Tuareg groups and Islamist factions have fluctuated in the past, the strong Russian presence in northern Mali has led to the current cooperation between the Azawad Army and JNIM.

JNIM appears to be pursuing a strategy of gradual attrition—not aimed at the immediate capture of Bamako, but at provoking its internal collapse through economic strangulation, political delegitimisation, and entrenchment within local communities. This strategy, openly articulated in the group’s propaganda—which describes foreign investors as economic colonisers—seeks to exacerbate local grievances and erode the military regime’s legitimacy.

(Photo: still image from a Russia-1 TV report showing a column of burning fuel tankers, filmed from an Africa Corps helicopter following a JNIM attack in the Sikasso region.)

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