On 26 October, President Vladimir Putin visited a joint command post, where he attended a meeting with Chief of the Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov. During the session, Gerasimov stated that on 21 October 2025, Russia had successfully conducted a test of the 9M730 BUREVESTNIK missile — designated by NATO as SSC-X-9 SKYFALL.

The system is a nuclear-powered, nuclear-capable cruise missile. The launch reportedly took place from Novaya Zemlya, an archipelago in northern Russia within the Arctic Ocean. Novaya Zemlya was a key Soviet nuclear testing site during the Cold War — notably, the location of the Tsar Bomba test in 1961, the most powerful nuclear device ever detonated.

According to Gerasimov, the missile flew for around 15 hours, covering a distance of 14,000 km. However, the General stressed that this might not represent the system’s maximum range. If confirmed, this would mark the first test of the BUREVESTNIK over such distance and duration. Gerasimov added that the missile’s technical features allow for precise engagement of highly protected targets at any range, and that the test included vertical and horizontal maneuvers designed to evade air and missile defense systems.

Following the test, the Norwegian Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (DSA) reported no increase in radiation levels detected from Russia. However, a nuclear-powered ramjet cruise missile like the BUREVESTNIK would theoretically produce detectable emissions. It is worth recalling that, shortly after the missile’s existence was first announced in 2018, the Norwegian environmental group Bellona suggested that an Arctic radiation spike recorded that same winter might have been caused by emissions from the missile’s air-cooled reactor core.

From a technical standpoint, such a weapon would use rocket boosters, likely liquid-fueled, to reach the speed required for ramjet operation. In the case of the SLAM (Supersonic Low-Altitude Missile) — a similar US Air Force project developed in the 1960s under Project PLUTO — the nuclear ramjet lacked any shielding to contain radiation. This design choice stemmed from the need to keep the propulsion unit compact enough to fit inside the missile. Moreover, the SLAM’s exhaust trail contained unburned fissile material, which would have contaminated all areas flown over, regardless of whether they were enemy or friendly territory. The project was abandoned in 1964, as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) were deemed more effective and reliable.

If the BUREVESTNIK indeed employs nuclear propulsion, as claimed by Russian authorities, the risk of accidents is tangible. Previous tests have been problematic, with the most serious incident occurring in 2019, when an explosion aboard a barge in the White Sea near Nenoksa killed 5 Rosatom scientists. The blast was attributed to the reactor of a recovered BUREVESTNIK, likely a remnant of earlier tests conducted in 2017, and it caused a radiation spike in the Russian city of Severodvinsk.

Although details remain opaque, it is clear that using nuclear propulsion in any atmospheric vehicle poses serious challenges. “BUREVESTNIK tests carry a risk of accidents and localized radioactive emissions,” stated the Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS) in a report published last year. This risk is particularly high during unarmed test flights, when the missile must inevitably crash to the ground or into the sea, raising questions about how such tests are actually conducted.

A nuclear-powered missile offers virtually unlimited range, unconstrained by conventional fuel. It can follow unpredictable trajectories and be difficult to intercept — though still easier to shoot down than ballistic missiles. Once launched, its flight profile could exploit gaps in defense and early-warning systems. This is why space-based surveillance architectures, including those capable of detecting low-flying aerial threats, are in growing demand.

The US Congress has recently included $2.2 billion in additional funding for spaceborne Air Moving Target Indicator (AMTI) capabilities in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, amid a general reduction in traditional airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) capacity. The US Space Force is currently assessing realistic options for developing future satellites capable of continuously tracking aerial threats from orbit. The Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) — aimed at defining the Space Force’s strategy for space-based AMTI capabilities — is expected to be completed by autumn 2025.

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