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In the last few weeks, the newly sworn in US President, Donald Trump, reaffirmed US’ interest in acquiring Greenland, a choice justified as “a need for US national security”, but also for the “free world”.
Washington’s appetite for Greenland is not new. The first (failed) attempt to buy the island dates back to 1946. Four years later, the US opened the Thule Air Base, recently renamed Pituffik Space Base. This military installation, which is US’ northernmost base, is dedicated to ballistic missile early warning and satellite monitoring. Back to today, President Trump had already showed interest in Greenland during its first mandate, but his recent claims are (slowly) taken more seriously by Copenhagen and the EU.
A phone call with Danish PM, Mette Frederiksen, on 24 January, has worked as a sort of tipping point for European capitals. According to some EU diplomats, this was an “horrendous” and “really firm” discussion. On another occasion, Trump threatened Copenhagen with targeted tariffs should it oppose an US acquisition of Greenland. “I think we are going to have it”, he declared last week, adding that "I don't really know what claim Denmark has to it, but it would be a very unfriendly act if they didn't allow that to happen because it is for the protection of the free world".
In the last weeks, Denmark has been actively working to reaffirm its control of the area, both on the domestic and the international front. On 27 January, the government approved the allocation of €2 billion in defence, including the procurement of 3 new Arctic ships and additional long-range drones, and the strengthening of satellite capacities. In the meantime, PM Frederiksen has multiplied gatherings with EU homologues to secure their support.
After a dinner with Nordic leaders last Saturday, she met with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in Berlin, French President Emmanuel Macron in Paris and NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte in Brussels this week. The situation of Greenland is also on the agenda of an informal meeting scheduled on 3 February to discuss international topics.
Danish intense political efforts are justified by strong geopolitical considerations but also demonstrate the lack of strategic vision within the EU – this is not really a piece of news. Being at the intersection of the North Atlantic and the Arctic Oceans, Greenland is a critical geographic node for military, economic and logistics purposes.
Climate change is dramatically increasing its strategic importance, with the accelerated melting of glaciers and ice sheets (that cover about 80% of the Island) having twofold consequences. On the one hand, it is exposing vast deposits of rare earth minerals, natural gas and oil, originating a “resource rush” in the Arctic. On the other hand, the melting is shifting maritime routes, potentially allowing to reduce shipping times and bypass traditional chokepoints.
In recent times, Greenland has become part of a broader Arctic competition, which also includes Russia and China. Moscow has been increasing its military presence in the area, with nuclear submarines carrying out patrol missions and a growing fleet of nuclear-powered ice breakers. Beijing has tried to leverage on economic investments. Several attempts to buy ports, mining rights and other infrastructures were blocked by Denmark so far, but Chinese companies’ interest in the area remains unchanged.
So far, nor the EU nor European countries have been worrying too much about the situation of Greenland, regardless of its growing geopolitical importance and its particular status that further complicates things. Indeed, the world’s largest island is an autonomous part of the Kingdom of Denmark, whose powers are limited to foreign, security and monetary policy. Most Greenlanders (56.000 people, of which 90% of indigenous Inuit) and local political parties support independence. In 2008, Nuuk voted in favour of the Self-Government Act, which provides local authorities with increased autonomy, granting them the possibility to negotiate and conclude international agreements with foreign countries. Because of a referendum held in 1982, Greenland left the European Community, automatically joined as Danish country, in 1985. Since then, the island has the status of EU overseas country and territory (OCTs). Its citizens are EU citizens (because they also are Danish), but Greenland’s territory is not part of the EU. This means that a legal debate might rise should Copenhagen invoke article 42.7 of the Treaty of the EU in case of aggression to Greenland.
Following the abolition of the defence opt-out clause in 2022, Denmark can ask for the application of the EU mutual assistance clause should its territory be threatened. But, technically speaking, Greenland is not part of the EU territory. As usually happens when it comes to foreign policy, security and defence issues, the EU and its members are now in “panic mode”.
Leaders have started to express their support to Denmark and their attachment to the protection of EU borders. The French foreign affairs minister, Jean-Noël Barrot, said on Tuesday that France “will be there” should Denmark ask for assistance.
“We are ready to defend our member state”, European Commissioner for Defence, Andrius Kubilius, said this week.
In an interview over the weekend, the chairman of the EU military committee, general Robert Brieger, said that it would make sense to consider stationing European troops in Greenland to “send a strong signal and maybe contribute to regional stability”.
Probably Greenland will not become a new US state. However, the ongoing debate is the umpteenth demonstration of European unpreparedness on foreign policy matters, especially when it comes to the identification of its vital interests and their protection. The “panic mode” we are observing is a dangerous stance, considering President Trump’s assertiveness and the fact that he has been in office for ten days only.