The city of Taiz and Yemen's western coast have returned to be the centre of gravity of the war between the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) — the internationally recognized Government of Aden — and the Houthis.

Taiz is a crucial node becuse of its position between the inland plateau, the city of Aden, and the Red Sea: the surrounding heights command the lines of communication to and from the city and threaten the last artery toward Aden. Houthi control of those heights would mean strangling government supply lines and favoring the city's capitulation.

Between late September and early October, the Houthis intensified operations to the north, south, and west of Taiz, advancing in the al-Mawasit district — in the southern part of Taiz governorate — and on the northern heights that control the route toward Aden, rendering several segments of the mountain road impassable and seizing them. Houthi pressure also extended to Turbah: located 42 km south of Taiz, the town is a key junction linking Lahj and Aden, essential for keeping the Taiz-Aden corridor open. A stable Ansar Allah advance there would narrow the PLC's room for maneuver, linking inland operations with positions gained along the coast. In a bid to halt this maneuver, on 2 October Yemeni government aircraft carried out over 20 airstrikes in 3 hours against Houthi troops, moving vehicles, and positions in Taiz province.

On 4 October, PLC Chairman Rashad al-Alimi announced a campaign to recover lost territory — dubbed Dawn of Yemen — and relieve pressure on Taiz.

The PLC's reaction, however, was not limited to the defense of Taiz; it also developed in the coastal sector near Bab el-Mandeb. PLC units — specifically the Giants Brigade and the Homeland Shield Forces, backed by Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) airstrikes (which also hit the capital Sana'a) — launched a rapid counteroffensive along the Bab el-Mandeb–Mocha axis to retake positions lost during the Houthi offensive of 9-11 September.

Initially, PLC forces recaptured the town of Dhubab, in the Taiz district immediately north of the strait, along with several surrounding positions including the airport. The offensive then continued up the coast toward the outskirts of Mocha, as the Houthis abandoned some hard-to-defend lowland positions and fell back toward the surrounding heights.

The PLC's success, however, proved less definitive than official statements suggested. Exploiting more favorable terrain, between 5 and 6 October the Houthis launched a fresh counterattack: hit-and-run actions combined with FPV drone strikes stabilized the front north of the airport and clawed back ground around Dhubab, while ballistic missile launches — with the now-established support of ISR "spotter" drones for targeting and Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA), Ed. — against PLC columns and force concentrations slowed the arrival of government reinforcements. There is insufficient evidence to speak of a consolidated Houthi reconquest of Dhubab or its airport, but the counterattack clearly halted the government advance northward.

The battle then shifted to the heights, where PLC forces opened operations against al-Waziiyah — a mountainous district east of Mocha and west of Taiz — to secure the flank of the coastal push and prevent the Houthis from dominating government lines from above. In parallel, Ansar Allah redirected part of its pressure against the rear — targeting columns and rearward positions in particular, and striking Aden airport — and against Saudi Arabian energy infrastructure, hitting among others a Saudi Aramco facility south of Riyadh and the Khurais oilfield, 150 km southeast of the capital, aiming to strike the PLC's principal sponsor.

The so-far unsuccessful outcome of the government counteroffensive — despite RSAF air support and a level of coordination between pro-Saudi and southern separatist forces unprecedented by past standards — underscores the PLC's inability to sustain multiple fronts simultaneously (Taiz, Bab el-Mandeb, Aden) and its dependence on a handful of supply routes that are easily attacked and exposed to fire from the heights (with the Houthis making ever-greater use of suicide FPV drones). For their part, the Houthis have demonstrated an ability to integrate ground maneuver with ballistic missiles and drones into a strategy consistent with the broader regional competition.

The clashes confirm the true center of gravity of the conflict: control of the heights, the supply routes, and the approaches to the coast. Until either side manages to convert tactical gains into stable territorial control, Yemen's southwestern front will remain open and directly connected to Red Sea security.

With operations still underway, the situation on the ground remains fluid; updates will follow.

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