It took the end of the Orbán era and the restart of a Soviet-era pipeline for the European Union to finally untangle the knot of aid to Kyiv.

While much of the world was mesmerized by the Strait of Hormuz, on 23 April Brussels pulled off a breakthrough that Ukraine had been waiting for a long time. After over two months of political and diplomatic gridlock, EU leaders finally reached a deal to release a €90 billion package for Ukraine covering 2026 and 2027.

Cyprus’ Finance Minister Makis Keravnos, speaking on behalf of the EU’s rotating presidency, promised that the money Ukraine needs will start arriving soon. “Loan disbursements will start flowing as soon as possible, providing vital support for Ukraine’s most pressing budgetary needs. The EU remains steadfast in its support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,” Keravnos said after the decision.

The package, approved by the extraordinary European Council meeting on 23-24 April in Cyprus, comes as an EU-backed loan and is a crucial lifeline for Kyiv. Repayment will be tied to profits from frozen Russian assets. Of the total, about €60 billion will go to defense and military support, helping Ukraine invest in its military industry and procure weapons, while the remaining €30 billion will cover the country’s basic budget needs.

The green light, anticipated on 22 April during the meeting of EU ambassadors, was made possible by two intertwined developments: the end of the political cycle of Hungary’s former Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, and the reactivation of the Druzhba oil pipeline, which had been taken offline due to damage Kyiv attributed to Russia and which has now resumed operations.

Originally, the plan had been designed by Brussels months earlier as an alternative to the direct use of roughly €300 billion in frozen Russian assets, an option that would have carried significant international legal risks and potential systemic tensions across European financial markets. Subsequently, the €90 billion option had been blocked by Orbán, who turned the issue into a domestic political lever during the electoral campaign. The Hungarian leader had made his consent conditional on the reopening of the Druzhba pipeline, damaged in previous months and, according to Budapest, also delayed due to repair issues attributed to Kyiv. The message was clear - oil, no aid.

The turning point came on 12 April with Orbán’s electoral defeat and the rise of Péter Magyar, head of the Tisza movement. The end of sixteen years of national-conservative rule produced immediate effects on the energy front as well. In the following days, Kyiv accelerated repairs on Druzhba. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced the completion of the works, while Hungarian energy group MOL confirmed the resumption of flows to Hungary and Slovakia.

With a new government in Budapest, the general political landscape shifted fast. The Hungarian veto was lifted before the European summit even began, clearing the way for the aid package and the EU’s twentieth sanctions round against Moscow, targeting regional banks, crypto-based evasion networks, Russia’s shadow fleet, and key parts of its economy.

There is relief in Brussels over the deal, but also a lot of caution. Hungary’s new government is still untested, and Péter Magyar, even as he signals warming ties with the EU, still holds nationalist views on several crucial issues. Meanwhile, Slovakia’s Robert Fico could become another possible troublemaker, Though he dropped his veto, he is still against direct EU military involvement.

Additionally, a new uncertainty is emerging - Bulgaria. The electoral success of the bloc linked to Rumen Radev has fuelled concerns that Sofia could replace Budapest as the main brake on EU anti-Russian policies. The country is strategically important not only politically, but also industrially and energetically, as one of the EU’s main producers of ammunition compatible with Soviet-era weaponry used by Ukraine.

Broader picture

The European Council’s approval of the €90 billion loan for Ukraine is undeniably a victory for European diplomacy. But it is a partial one, given it was achieved through a convergence of favourable electoral outcomes, energy recalibrations, and political vetoes that were gradually eroded by circumstances.

Brussels may be breathing a sigh of relief now that Orbán is gone, but the reality is more complicated. The EU can act decisively, sometimes even surprisingly fast, but it is still hampered by a web of cross-vetoes and slow, fragmented decision-making.

It is still unclear what will come out of the next big Council talks about the EU Aspides naval mission in the Red Sea, or whether Europe will build a stronger, more unified naval force that can stabilise the region without making things spiral out of control.

Different speeds

At the same time, a Europe moving at different speeds is becoming increasingly visible. Major member states are building parallel strategic axes. France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, which is increasingly redefining its geopolitical role, are strengthening coordination in managing international crises, while rearmament continues, with Germany presenting a new Bundeswehr strategy on 22 April focused on a major military expansion.

The €90 billion for Kyiv is therefore a real turning point, but one that is rather late and conditional. It comes after months of paralysis, energy compromises, and government changes. Above all, it confirms a now-evident dynamic: on security and war, the Europe of the “willing” is moving faster than the Europe of institutions.

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